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Abstract  
We present a model in which specialization and trade occur not as a result of exogenous differences in 
factor endowments or technologies, but because of endogenous differences in culture (preferences 
including social norms) and institutions (contracts). Goods differ in the kinds of contracts that are 
appropriate for their production, and so strategic complementarities between contracts and the nature 
of social norms may result in a multiplicity of cultural-institutional equilibria that provide the basis for 
comparative advantage and specialization. In our evolutionary model of endogenous preferences and 
institutions under autarchy, trade and factor mobility, transitions among multiple asymptotically stable 
cultural-institutional conventions may occur as a result of decentralized and un-coordinated 
contractual or behavioral innovations by employers or employees. We show that: i) specialization and 
trade may arise and enhance welfare even when the countries are identical other than their cultural-
institutional conventions; ii) trade liberalization does not lead to convergence, it reinforces the 
cultural-institutional differences upon which comparative advantage is based and may thus impede 
even Pareto-improving cultural-institutional transitions; and iii) by contrast, greater mobility of factors 
of production favors decentralized transitions to a superior cultural-institutional convention by 
reducing the minimum number of cultural or institutional innovators necessary to induce a transition 
as well as the cost of innovating. 
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1. Introduction 
Among history’s great puzzles are the many instances of centuries-long persistence of 
institutional and cultural differences between populations, often enduring long after their initial 
causes have disappeared. Institutions and elite cultures that owed their origin to the 16
th century 
exploitation of slaves and coerced Native American labor persisted long after sugar and gold had 
lost their central role in the Latin American economies (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000). Current 
levels of distrust in distinct African populations vary inversely with the exposure to the slave 
trade that ended two centuries ago (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2010). Differing levels of 
cooperation and civic values among Italian urban areas appear to be the legacy of autonomous 
city-state institutions or their absence half a millennium earlier (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 
2009). The effects of the differing tax and land tenure systems imposed by the British Raj in the 
18
th and 19
th century persisted in post-independence India (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). 
In epochs and social orders marked by limited contact and restricted competition among 
geographically separated areas, persistent cultural and institutional differences are hardly 
surprising. But this is not the case in a globally integrated world economy. In this paper we 
explain how the decentralized updating of both preferences and contractual choices can support 
durable cultural and institutional differences that may provide a basis for specialization, 
comparative advantage, and hence trade, which in turn stabilizes the cultural and institutional 
differences. Our explanation hinges on the endogenous codetermination of institutions, cultures, 
and economic specialization, a nexus long-studied by economists with a historical bent 
(Gerschenkron, 1944; Greif and Tabellini, 2010; Kindleberger, 1962; Sokoloff and Engerman, 
2000), but not heretofore formally modeled.  
We refer to differences across economies in the distribution of employment contracts as 
institutional differences, while between-economy variations in the distribution of preferences 
(including social norms) are termed cultural differences. We thus develop a two-country/two-
contract/two-preference/two-good model in which countries may differ in their institutions and 
cultures. Production and distribution are governed by employers’ choice between two contracts, 
either joint residual claimancy under share contracts (partnerships) or forcing contracts with the 
employer as residual claimant. The relevant preference differences are captured by assuming that 
employees are either reciprocal or self-regarding. Finally, goods differ in the extent to which 
their production depends on qualitative labor, namely that which is prohibitively costly to verify 
and hence cannot be cost-effectively secured  by a forcing contract  requiring an explicit labor 
input. Where non-verifiable aspects of work are important to production, social norms such as   3
reciprocity or a positive work ethic may be required for high levels of productivity.  
The main novelty of our approach is that, rather than treating institutions and preferences as 
exogenous or determined by a national-level constitutional bargain, we use evolutionary game 
theory to model the interacting dynamics of both as the result of decentralized non-cooperative 
interactions among economic agents. Like Greif (1994), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009), 
Tabellini (2008) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), we study the economic importance of 
cultural differences. Unlike all above papers but in common with Bisin and Verdier (2001), 
Bowles (1998), Fershtman and Bar-Gill (2005), Galor and Maov (2002), and Doepke and 
Zilibotti (2008), we model cultural evolution. 
 In our model, the choice of contract that maximizes employers’ profits depends on the 
preferences which prevail in a given country, so firms face a problem of matching contracts and 
preferences as in Prendergast (2008). Partnership contracts, for example, are more profitable 
where social preferences like the work ethic or reciprocity are common. The distribution of 
preferences in turn is based on a cultural updating process in which the payoffs associated with 
different preferences (and the behaviors they support) depend on the distribution of contracts in 
the economy. It is this mutual dependence of preferences and contracts and the differences 
among goods in the importance of non-verifiable qualitative labor that supports the multiplicity 
of equilibria and provides the basis for national specialization in our model, thus playing a role 
analogous to technology-based economies of scale in Paul Krugman’s (1987) model of trade 
among countries with identical factor endowments and technologies. Transitions may occur 
among these cultural-institutional conventions when sufficiently many innovators deviate from 
the status quo convention (adopting non-best response preferences or contracts) due to individual 
experimentation and other forms of idiosyncratic play. We derive three key results.   
First, for historical reasons two otherwise identical countries may experience different 
cultural-institutional conventions, and these cross-country differences in the institutional and 
cultural environment, like differences in technologies in the Ricardian approach or factor 
endowments in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, are an independent source of comparative 
advantage.  
Second, economic integration reinforces rather than destabilizes institutional and cultural 
diversity and may impede transitions, even to Pareto-improving conventions. This result 
contradicts the view, popular among critics of trade liberalization since John Maynard Keynes 
(1933), that trade will lead to institutional and cultural convergence and thus defeat attempts by 
nations that, as he put it (p. 762), would prefer to “have a try at working out our own salvation”.  
This is especially thought to be true when one nation’s cultural-institutional equilibrium confers   4
absolute advantage in both products. But since trade allows countries to specialize in the goods 
that are relatively more advantaged given their institutions and preferences, it increases the joint 
surplus in the cultural-institutional status quo even in the absolutely disadvantaged country. 
These gains from trade increase the joint surplus available to employers and employees and, 
hence, the cost of a mismatch that is likely to occur as the result of deviations from the prevalent 
preferences and contracts. By making experimentation more costly the gains from trade thus 
increase the impediments to cultural-institutional transitions. Trade may also increase the 
number of preference or contractual innovators required to induce a transition to the superior 
convention. Thus, in an open-economy setting a nation’s cultural-institutional convention may 
persist over very long periods, even when a Pareto-superior convention exists and when the 
status quo convention confers absolute disadvantage with respect to other countries in all goods. 
The source of persistent inefficiency in this model is the coordination failure arising from the 
decentralized nature of preference formation and contractual choice. 
Third, in contrast to trade, factor market integration facilitates convergence to superior 
culture and institutions. The reason is that factor mobility provides a kind of “innovation 
insurance” as it lowers the expected costs of deviating from the status quo; it also reduces the 
minimum number of innovators necessary to induce Pareto-improving cultural-institutional 
transitions. Factor market integration thus reduces both the size and (loosely speaking) the depth 
of the basin of attraction of the inferior equilibrium.  
We begin with the basic assumptions of our model and the empirical evidence motivating 
them (section 2). We then develop a model of endogenous preferences and contractual choice, 
extending the standard 2x2 model of international exchange to a 2x2x2x2 model, and illustrate 
cultural-institutional comparative advantage (section 3). In section 4 we introduce the model’s 
dynamics and show that multiple asymptotically stable cultural-institutional equilibria may exist. 
We then explore the persistence of cultural and institutional differences following trade 
integration (section 5), and factor mobility (section 6). Section 7 discusses related literature and 
concludes.  
 
2.  Goods, preferences and contracts 
An economy is populated by employers and employees. Employers hire employees to produce 
one of two goods, the employment relationship being a random employee-employer match for a 
single interaction in which the employer offers a contract under which the employee works. 
Labor is perfectly mobile across industries but (until section 6) immobile across countries. Our   5
model is based on four distinctive assumptions that we believe are of broad empirical relevance. 
First, there are two aspects of labor. QuaNtitative labor (denoted by the subscript N) includes 
time at work, compliance with directions, simple effort readily measured either by input or 
output, and other aspects of work that are readily observable, either directly or that may be 
inferred from the associated outputs. Because it is readily observable, quantitative labor is cost-
effectively verifiable and can be enforced by contracts.  By contrast, quaLitative work (denoted 
by the subscript L) consists of care, creativity, problem solving and other non-routine aspects of 
work that are more difficult to verify, and hence not cost-effectively subject to explicit contracts 
conditional on individual performance. Production of all goods requires quantitative labor and is 
also enhanced by qualitative labor (though, as we will see, in differing degree). Each employee 
may provide either quantitative labor alone or both quantitative and qualitative labor.  
Second, there are two goods. One is intensive in quantitative labor and termed transparent 
(the t-good) because the labor activities that are readily observed are relatively more important in 
its production. The production of the opaque good (o-good), by contrast, depends more 
intensively on qualitative aspects of work. Examples of the latter are knowledge-intensive goods 
(and services), complex and quality-variable manufactured goods, personal services ranging 
from legal advice to preparing meals, and care-sensitive agricultural products (such as tobacco, 
many vegetables and fruits) and wine. For these goods the necessary labor inputs cannot be 
verified because they are not directly observable and cannot be indirectly inferred from the 
resulting output.  Transparent goods include standardized manufactured goods (exemplified by 
most good produced on an assembly line and any good the production of which is cost 
effectively compensated by piece rates), most grains and sugar.   
Hence, denoting by 
i
L Q  the quantity of good i (i = o,t) obtained using one unit of both 
qualitative and quantitative labor, and by 
i
N Q  the output obtained with a single unit of 














>                                                            (1) 
that is, the increase in production obtained employing both quantitative and qualitative labor 
rather than quantitative labor only is relatively greater in the opaque than in the transparent 
sector. 
Our third assumption is that some employees have preferences over the form of the contract 
under which they work per se, that is, in addition to the material payoffs. For some individuals,   6
close supervision and threats of sanctions for non-compliance signal distrust or otherwise offend 
reciprocal or other social preferences essential to mutually beneficial exchange. This is found in 
a large number of natural environments (Bewley, 1999) and experimental studies (Fehr, Klein, 
and Schmidt, 2007; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; surveyed in Bowles, 2008, and Bowles and Polania, 
2009). We simplify by assuming just two kinds of employees. Those who we term Reciprocators 
(denoted by the superscript R) who care about the form of the contract per se: in a dyadic 
interaction their utility is increasing in their own payoffs and may be either increasing or 
decreasing in the payoffs of the  employer depending on the individual’s belief about the type of 
the other, in the spirit of Rabin (1993), Levine (1998) and Fehr and Falk (2002).Thus, the utility 
of employee h  who is matched with employer k depends on his own material payoff ( h π ), 
including the disutility of labor, and on the payoff of employer k ( k π ): 
, k hk h h hk U π γ α π + =                                                       (2) 
where  h α  (>0 for Reciprocator and =0 otherwise) is the strength of h’s reciprocity preferences 
and γhk (= −1, 1) is h’s belief about k’s type, the latter depending on the form of contract that k 
offers h. In the model below a Partnership (denoted by the superscript P), in which the employer 
and the employee are joint residual claimants on the firm’s output and the employee is free to 
choose whether to supply both qualitative and quantitative labor, or only quantitative labor, 
signals the good will and trust of the employer, leading to γhk=1; while the employer’s close 
surveillance and the threat of termination under a Forcing contract (superscript F), signals 
distrust with γhk= −1 as a result. Consequently, there may be a mismatch between the firm’s 
contractual structure and the employees’ preferences. 
Other employees, who we will term Homo economicus (superscript E), care only about their 
own material payoffs ( 0 = h α ) so that  h hk U π =  for any k. We refer to preferences of this kind as 
self-regarding. As we will see in section 3, from this it follows that social preferences such as a 
strong work ethic, truth telling and intrinsic motivation may be essential to the production of 
opaque goods, because Forcing contracts appealing to conventional self-regarding motives 
cannot elicit qualitative labor due to the lack of verifiability of this input. 
The final assumption is that while both culture and institutions are endogenous, neither is the 
result of instantaneous individual maximization or collective choice. Rather both are durable 
characteristics of individuals and organizations that evolve in a decentralized environment under 
the influence of  long-run society-wide payoff differences. Institutions and preferences are 
acquired and abandoned by a trial and error process often taken place at critical times, the birth   7
of a firm, for example, for contractual forms, or early childhood or adolescence for preference 
formation. Because childhood socialization and the other processes by which preferences are 
acquired take place under the influence of religious instruction, schooling and other effects 
operating at the national level, we represent this process of cultural evolution by a society-wide 
dynamics operating prior to economic matching for production. Thus individuals do not 
condition the updating of their preferences on the kind of contract (Partnership, Forcing) they are 
offered in any period; rather they periodically update by best responding to the distribution of 
contracts in the past. Similarly firms do not condition their contractual offers on the type of the 
employee (Reciprocator, Homo economicus) with whom they are paired in a given period; rather 
they occasionally update by best responding to the past distribution of employee preferences. 
The correspondence between preferences, contracts and specialization implied by these four 
assumptions is widely observed. Eric Nilsson (1994) studied  the effects on comparative 
advantage and specialization resulting from the emancipation of slaves at the time of the U.S. 
Civil War. Cotton, according to Nilsson, was a “slave commodity” for which kinds of labor 
beyond that which could be coerced from the worker were of little importance. For other 
commodities – manufactures and tobacco in Nilsson’s empirical study – variations in the labor 
quality were more important, and impossible to secure by coercion. Nilsson exploited the natural 
experiment provided by the end of slavery to study the effect of an exogenous institutional shock 
on production specialization in 169 counties in the Confederacy. He found that the end of slavery 
brought about a significant shift away from the “slave commodity” (cotton) and towards 
manufactures and tobacco. Stefano Fenoaltea’s (1984) study of slave and non-slave production 
makes a similar distinction between “care intensive” and “effort intensive” productive activities, 
the former being opaque in our terminology and the latter transparent. A similar distinction 
between sugar and tobacco was made by Fernando Ortiz (1963) who contrasted the coerced 
labor and hierarchical and authoritarian culture of the sugar plantation regions of Cuba with the 
self-motivated labor and liberal culture of the tobacco family-farming areas. 
Norms and preferences influencing economic behavior differ significantly among societies 
(Inglehart, 1977; Henrich, Boyd, Bowles et al., 2005). In particular, reciprocal social preferences 
appear to be  more prevalent in the higher income countries. Among subjects in 15 countries, the 
level of cooperation sustained in a public goods experiment in which the altruistic punishment of 
free riders was possible was much higher in wealthier nations (Herrmann, Thoni, and Gaechter, 
2008). For these reasons we represent an economy whose cultural-institutional equilibrium is 
characterized by partnerships and extensive social preferences such as trust and the positive work 
ethic as having a “good” cultural-institutional environment and, as a result, enjoying absolute   8
advantage with respect to other countries in which forcing contracts and high levels of 
monitoring may elicit quantitative (but not qualitative) labor services from entirely self-regarding 
economic agents. This view is consistent with the observation that opaque goods make up a 
substantial fraction of the output of the more advanced economies (production and distribution of 
information-intensive goods and many services ranging from health care to entertainment and 
other recreational services), whereas poorer nations produce large shares of agricultural and 
manufactured goods that are closer to the transparent pole of the opaque-transparent continuum.  
 
3. Cultural-institutional equilibrium under autarchy  
Employers maximize profits, while employees maximize utility. Agents consume a composite 
bundle (indicated by c) of the two goods produced. For simplicity, we assume that the composite 
good is made up of one unit of the transparent (t) and one unit of the opaque (o) good; thus 
prices have no effect on consumption proportions. Denoting by 
o p  and  
t p  the price of the o-
good and the price of the t-good, we define  ) /(
t o o o p p p + = ρ  and  ) /(
t o t t p p p + = ρ  respectively the 
value of the opaque good in terms of the composite good (how many units of the c-good one can 
purchase with one unit of the o-good) and the value of the transparent good in terms of the 
composite good (how many units of the c-good one can purchase with one unit of the t-good). 
Payoffs (profits and utility respectively) are measured in the number of units of the composite 
good commanded. Markets are competitive in the sense that employers take the price of the good 
as exogenously given.  
The (risk-neutral) utility function of employees is additive in consumption of the composite 
good, the subjective utility associated with the contract (for the reciprocal agents) and the 
disutility associated with the type of labor provided in production. Supplying quantitative labor  
incurs a cost η (>0), while supplying both quantitative and qualitative labor costs δ (>η).  
The key difference between a Forcing (F) contract and a Partnership (P) is that in the former 
the motivation to work is provided by the fear of being fired (as in many secondary labor market 
jobs), while in the latter the primary motivation is gain-sharing with the employer based on joint 
residual claimancy (as in many legal practices, financial consulting, and software design). Under 
the Forcing contract the employee is offered a fixed compensation (w>0) set by the employer to 
satisfy the participation constraint of the worker, is closely monitored and required to provide 
quantitative labor as a condition of continued employment. Under the Partnership the 
“employee” is offered half of the revenue of the Partnership and selects the type of labor   9
(quantitative alone or both quantitative and qualitative) without supervision. 
In the F-contract, providing quantitative work is sufficient for the worker to remain 
employed and paid, so the Homo economicus (E-type) employees offer quantitative labor, 
incurring the associated disutility η. If offered a P-contract, the E-worker also provides 
quantitative labor only as we assume that the worker’s share of increased output associated with 





i Q ρ Q ρ  (with 
i=o,t). By contrast, as we have seen, reciprocal (R-type) employees have preferences over the 
kind of contract that is offered by the employer per se. Under a Forcing contract the R-worker 
values the payoff of the employer negatively (γ =−1; the subscript hk for the individuals is 
hereafter omitted with no loss of clarity), subtracting  ()
ii
NR ρ Qw α μ −−  from his utility. As a 
result the R-worker (like the E-worker) provides quantitative labor only (also at a cost η). Under 
the Partnership, however, the R-worker’s positive valuation of the payoff to the partner (γ=1) is 





i Q Q ρ   (with 
i=o,t), and so the reciprocal type employee provides, in addition, qualitative aspects of work 
contributing to production (at a greater cost δ).   




i w Q ρ w μ α η − − − −  for the R-employee, where  R μ  is the employer’s cost of monitoring the 
reciprocal worker. The level of monitoring cost sufficient so that supplying quantitative labor is a 
best response by the employee is greater for the (dissatisfied) reciprocal worker so  RE μ μ ≥ , 
where  E μ  is the cost of monitoring the self-regarding worker (the following results are not 
affected if the monitoring costs are the same). 
We now determine the conditions under which each of the four contract-preference pairs 
({F,E}, {F,R}, {P,E} and {P,R}) may be Nash equilibria in the absence of trade. This will 
depend on relative prices of the goods which, because of the differing relative importance of 
qualitative labor in the production of the two goods, will in turn depend on whether (quantitative 
and) qualitative as well as quantitative labor is a best response of the employees.  In  autarchic 
equilibrium the only relative price, 
t o p p / , such that both goods are produced in the given 




L Q Q / , for pairs 




N Q Q / , where only 
quantitative labor is a best response. Using the subscript 1 and 2 to denote contract-preference 
pairs in which both quantitative and qualitative or just quantitative labor, respectively, are   10








t o Q Q p p / / 2 2 = . Accordingly, the relative price of 
the opaque (transparent) good in terms of the composite good respectively in the two situations 




























t Q Q Q ρ + = ).  
Table 1 reports the matrix of payoffs measured in units of composite good. Because by 
construction autarchic prices make producers indifferent to the choice of which product to 








o Q ρ Q ρ 2 2 = . Thus the entries in Table 1 are 
invariant across sectors. To find the Nash equilibria note that from the above description of the 





i Q Q , for any i=o,t 





i Q Q 2 1 ρ ρ > ). To exclude uninteresting cases where 
cultural-institutional differences could not occur in equilibrium, we further assume that 
) ( 2 2 E
i
N
i w Q μ ρ + > , for any i=o,t.  
Two Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist, namely {P,R}, that is the Partnership contract 
matched with the reciprocal employee, and {F,E}, that is the Forcing contract matched with the 
Homo economicus (see appendix A.1). We term these stable outcomes cultural-institutional 
conventions, meaning that conforming to them is a mutual best response as long as virtually all 
members of each sub-population (employers and employees) expect virtually all members of the 
other to conform to it. We denote the two conventions respectively by subscript 1 and 2.  As we 
are interested in the effect of trade and factor market liberalization on the quality of cultural-
institutional conventions, we assume that output with both qualitative and quantitative labor is 




L Q Q > 2 /   allowing an unambiguous ranking of the two 
outcomes by  guaranteeing that the {P,R} Nash equilibrium Pareto-dominates the {F,E} 
equilibrium. But this does not guarantee that {P,R} will be observed in practice in a dynamic 
setting because the second “inferior” convention is also asymptotically stable. (A third unstable 
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies exists; it will play an essential role in the dynamics of 
convention-switching studied in sections 4 and 5.) 
  Employee/Preferences 
Employer/Contract  Reciprocator Homo  economicus 
Partnership  /2 1
i
L
iQ ρ ,  δ Q ρ α
i
L
i − + /2 ) (1 1   2 / 2
i
N




Forcing contract  R
i
N
i μ w Q ρ − − 2 ,  ) ( 2 R
i
N
i w Q ρ w μ α η − − − −   E
i
N
i μ w Q ρ − − 2 ,  η w −
Table 1: Matrix of payoffs. (NOTE: Payoffs in bold type indicate pure stable Nash equilibria)   11
 Assume now that the world economy comprises two countries, 1 and 2, identical in all relevant 
respects (same technology, same demand function, no difference in worker skills or in the   
preferences they may adopt), except for different cultural-institutional conventions. Let us 
suppose that country 1 is near equilibrium 1 ({P,R}), so that all pairs are reciprocal types 
working under Partnership contracts, whereas country 2 is near equilibrium 2 ({F,E}), so that all 
pairs are self-regarding employees working under Forcing contracts. Because the two countries 
are identical other than their cultural-institutional equilibria, hereafter the subscript 1 (2) denotes 
country 1 (country 2) and also equilibrium 1 (equilibrium 2).  
In Figure 1 we represent the production possibility frontiers of the two countries, the slope 
of the dashed lines indicating the international terms of trade lying strictly between the two 








L Q Q > , country 1 enjoys an 
absolute advantage in the production of both goods. However, the cultural and institutional 
differences across countries (like differences in endowments or technologies in the standard 
model) result in differences in the ratios of marginal costs of goods in autarchy and, as a result, 
confer different comparative advantages to the two countries considered. Country 1, where the 
established cultural-institutional equilibrium is able to elicit qualitative (in addition to 
quantitative) labor in all the employment relations, is superior in the production of both 
commodities, but has a relatively greater advantage in the production of the o-good where 
qualitative aspects of work are relatively more important. By contrast, country 2 has a culture 
and institutions for which employees are willing to provide quantitative labor only; this country, 
as a consequence, has a comparative advantage in the production of the t-good that is relatively 
less intensive in non-verifiable labor services.  
Since in autarchic equilibrium the relative prices of the two countries are equal to the 
























1 = < = ,                                                     (3) 
or, equivalently, 
o o
2 1 ρ ρ <  (
t t
2 1 ρ ρ > ). Providing that the international terms of trade,  t
T
o
T p p /  
(the subscript “T” refers to trade), falls strictly between the autarchic relative prices of the two 
countries, specialization and trade will take place. Given the linearity of the two production 
possibility frontiers, country 1 will specialize entirely in the production of (and will export) the 
opaque good, while country 2 will specialize in the production of (and will export) the 
transparent good.   12
Unless the two economies happen to be of the “right” size, given the fixed proportions in the 
composite consumption good there will either be excess supply of one of the two goods under 
complete specialization following trade integration. To retain the valuable simplifications due to 
both complete specialization and fixed proportions in consumption we could (artificially, but 
harmlessly) assume that under trade integration the “smaller” nation specializes and that firms in 
the other country produce a joint product of the two goods in the proportions necessary to satisfy 
global demands for the two goods. We opt for the simpler assumption that the countries are of a 
size to equilibrate world commodity markets, thereby avoiding notational clutter associated with 
















Figure 1: Production possibility frontiers in the two countries. 
(NOTE: Each country has a normalized labor endowment of 1) 
 
Compared to autarchy, specialization and trade benefit both classes of individuals in country 1 
and employers in country 2. When cross-country barriers to trade are removed and in absence of 
transportation costs, the relative price of the opaque (transparent) good increases in country 1 
(country 2), whereas the relative price of the transparent (opaque) good decreases. It follows that 
o o
T 1 ρ ρ >  and 
t t
T 2 ρ ρ > : in both countries the good in which the country specializes becomes 
relatively more valuable in terms of the c-good (with one unit of the o-good (t-good) in country 1 
(country 2) one can purchase a greater number of units of the c-good under trade than in 












T Q Q 2 ρ ρ > : the c-good value of output in 
the two countries increases as a result of specialization. All the other terms (δ, η, w, μ and γ) in 
the payoff matrix (Table 1) are measured in units of the composite goods and so remain   13
unaltered.  
4. Dynamics 
To provide a framework for understanding the process of transitions from one convention to the 
other, we now study the asymptotic stability properties of the two conventions. We express the 
expected payoffs of employers and employees as a function of the distribution of contracts and 
worker types in each country, given the prevailing prices. For each economy there are two sets of 
prices to consider: autarchic prices (denoted by subscript 1 and 2, as above) and the prices 
common to both countries following trade (denoted by subscript “T”, as above). Employers and 
employees are matched after having updated their contracts and preferences based on the 
distribution of play in the past. Writing the fraction of the employees who were Reciprocators in 
the previous period as ω and using the payoffs in Table 1 with nationally specific equilibrium 
prices, the expected payoffs to employers offering the P- and F-contracts are 
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              (4) 
where i=o,t and j=1,2. Similarly, writing the fraction of the employers offering Partnerships in 
the previous period as φ, the expected payoffs to the R- and  E-employees are respectively: 
). )( 1 (
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              (5) 
where again i=o,t and j=1,2. These expected payoff functions are illustrated in Figure 2. 
To model the mutual dependence of preferences and contracts, suppose that both employers 
and employees periodically update the contracts they offer and their preferences (respectively) 
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Figure 2: Expected payoffs under autarchy to P- and F-employers (panel A) and to R- and E-employees 
(panel B). (NOTE: φj is the fraction of the employers offering Partnerships and ωj the fraction of the employees 
being Reciprocators in the previous period and in country j. The vertical intercepts are from Table 1 using 
nationally specific equilibrium prices in autarchy (j=1,2 and i=o,t); payoffs in bold type refer to the stable pure 
Nash equilibria) 
 
The updating process works as follows (Bowles, 2004). At the beginning of each period, 
individuals are exposed to a cultural or institutional model randomly selected from their sub-
population: for instance, an employer, named A, has the opportunity to observe the contract 
offered by another employer, named B, and to know her payoff. If employer B is the same type 
as employer A, A does not update. But if B is a different type, A compares the two payoffs and, 
if B has the greater payoff, switches to B’s type with a probability equal to β (>0) times the 
payoff difference, retaining her own type otherwise. It is easily shown that this process gives the 
replicator equations: 
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where  j=1,2 and τ stands for time.  We are interested in the stationary states, such that 
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 (7) 
where i=o,t and j=1,2. The resulting dynamical system is illustrated by the vector field in Figure 
3 where the arrows indicate the out-of-equilibrium adjustment given by the replicator dynamic 
(equations 6) and subscripts j are omitted with no loss of clarity. The states where  0 d d = / τ φ  and 
0 d d = / τ ω  are cultural-institutional equilibria. The state (
* ,ω
∗ φ ) is stationary, but it is a saddle: 
small movements away from  ∗ φ   or  * ω   are not self-correcting. (Two additional unstable 
stationary states, namely ( 0 1 = , = ω φ ) and ( 1 0 = , = ω φ ) are of no interest.) The asymptotically 
stable states are (1,1) (corresponding to convention 1, i.e. {P,R}, in Table 1)  and  (0,0) 





























Figure 3: Co-evolution of preferences and institutions, and persistence 
of two cultural-institutional equilibria in a given country. 
 
In this deterministic setting, the initial state determines which of these two asymptotically stable 
states occurs. Of course institutions (and, in some cases, even cultures) may be altered by a joint 
decision of hypothetical representatives of one or both classes (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).   16
But non-cooperative (that is decentralized, bottom-up) transitions are also possible. To study 
such a process we assume that occasional idiosyncratic (non-best response) updating of both 
preferences and contractual offers occurs (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob, 1993; Young, 1993, 
1998). Suppose that with probability 1−ε the myopic best response updating process described 
above occurs, but with a small probability ε the employee chooses randomly from the two 
preferences and the employer likewise randomizes her contractual offer. The preference or 
contractual innovations represented by idiosyncratic play may be due to deliberate 
experimentation, error, or any other reason for non-best response play. We assume throughout 
that the rate of idiosyncratic play is sufficiently small that the equilibrium conventions described 
above are persistent, defined as having an expected duration of more than one period (i.e. ε < 
critical number that would induce a transition to the other convention), so that in equilibrium 1 
* 1 ω ε − <  and  * 1 φ − < ε ,  while in equilibrium 2  * ω ε <  and  * φ < ε . Jointly these persistence 
conditions imply ε < 1/2. 
In the resulting perturbed Markov process over the long run both {P,R} and {F,E} will 
occur, with infrequent transitions between the basins of attraction of these two equilibria (Young, 
1998). In the absence of system-level exogenous shocks, for even moderately large populations 
and plausible rates of idiosyncratic play cultural-institutional equilibria will persist over very 
long periods and the system will spend more time at the convention with the larger basin of 
attraction. Thus equilibrium 1 will be more persistent in this sense if  ) 1 )( 1 ( * * * * ω ω − − < φ φ  that 
is, if {P,R} is the risk-dominant equilibrium, and conversely for equilibrium 2.  
 
5. Trade integration and the persistence of inefficient equilibria 
Our finding that the culture and institutions prevailing in each country are a source of 
comparative advantage, and that opening up to trade enables the two otherwise identical 
countries to enjoy welfare gains, would be of little interest if trade were to erode the differences 
upon which cultural-institutional comparative advantage depends. Because both culture and 
institutions are endogenous in our model, we can determine if the two asymptotically stable 
cultural-institutional equilibria persist after the two countries open up to international exchange, 
or equivalently, the two critical values,  *
j φ  and  *
j ω , remain in the unit interval following trade.  
We ask whether in a stochastic environment trade favors cultural and institutional 
convergence.  As we are interested in convergence to superior cultural-institutional conventions, 
we consider the effect of trade (and, subsequently, factor market integration) on the stability of   17
country 2’s inferior {F,E} convention (technically, we ask: what is the effect of trade on the 
expected waiting time for a transition from equilibrium 2 to equilibrium 1.) Because cultural-
institutional transitions occur as a result of deviations from the status quo convention, the effect 
of trade on convergence can be explored in two ways: by looking at either the minimum number 
of innovators (deviants) required to induce a transition (termed the “resistance” to a transition) or 
the expected cost that an innovator incurs, the latter measuring the incentives against innovating 
and the selection pressures operating against those who do. Though we do model the innovation 
process formally here, in a more complete model with state dependent rates of idiosyncratic play 
(Bergin and Lipman, 1996) the increased cost of innovating plausibly would reduce the rate of 
innovation, thereby prolonging the expected duration of the convention.  
Figure 4 shows how the expected payoffs for each group of individuals change as a result of 
trade (expected payoff lines after trade are drawn in dashed type). Payoffs received by the 
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Fig. 4: Payoff changes to P- and F-employers (panel A) and R- and E-employees (panel B) after trade 
openness. (NOTE: φj is the fraction of the employers offering Partnerships and ωj the fraction of the employees 
being Reciprocators in the previous period and in country j. The vertical intercepts are from Table 1 using 
nationally specific equilibrium prices (j=1,2 and i=o,t); payoffs in bold type refer to the stable pure Nash 
equilibria. Dashed lines represent expected payoff lines after trade integration. The post-trade corresponding 
vertical intercepts differ from the autarchic case because of the increase in ρj) 
 
Trade increases the amount of the composite good that may be purchased with one unit of the 
good in which each country specializes (
o o
T 1 ρ ρ >  and 
t t
T 2 ρ ρ > ), giving the dashed lines in the 
figure. It is readily confirmed (from inspection of their definition in equations (7)) that after   18
trade, the critical values of  j φ  and  j ω  remain within the unit interval in both countries, implying 
that trade integration does not destroy the cultural-institutional differences upon which 
specialization is based.  
Inspection of the figure also confirms that  trade increases the cost of deviating from the 
status quo cultural-institutional convention for both groups in both countries, implying that non-
coordinated convergence from one equilibrium to the other is less likely under trade integration 
than under autarchy. This can be seen from equations (6), along with the fact that trade increases 
both )] ( ) ( [ 1 1 ω v ω v F P −  and  )] ( ) ( [ 1 1 φ φ E R v v −  when  1 1 1 φ = = ω  (equilibrium 1) and increases 
both )] ( ) ( [ 2 2 ω v ω v P F −  and   )] ( ) ( [ 2 2 φ φ R E v v −  when  2 2 0 φ = = ω  (equilibrium 2) (see appendix 
A.2.1). The reason is that deviating from the convention almost always entails a mismatch, the 
result being forgoing some of or all the surplus, the value of which is higher after trade 
integration.  
In addition to increasing the incentive not to innovate and the selection pressures operating 
against those who do, trade may even increase the number of innovators necessary to induce a 
transition from the inferior equilibrium 2 to equilibrium 1. To see this we study the effect of 
trade (increase in  i
j ρ ) on  *
j φ  and  *
j ω . In the case of  *
j ω  the result is unambiguous: trade 
increases the critical fraction of reciprocal workers necessary to induce the F-type employers to 
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where j=1,2 and i=o,t. The reason can be seen by noting that the critical values  *
j φ  and  *
j ω  are 
simply given by the cost (for respectively employees and employers) of deviating from the {F,E} 
convention divided by the sum of this cost and the cost of deviating from the {P,R} convention. 
While the costs of deviating from both equilibria increase for the employers, trade increases the 
cost of deviating from the {F,E} equilibrium of country 2 proportionally more.  
The effect of trade on  *
j φ  cannot be signed in general, but (under plausible conditions) it too 
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L Q w Q Q .  This will be 
the case if the degree of reciprocity and the relative productiveness of qualitative labor are 
sufficiently great (or if the excess disutility of providing qualitative labor is sufficiently small). 
Thus removing impediments to international exchange need not destabilize and, indeed, may 
fortify the preexisting cultural and institutional differences upon which specialization and trade 
are based even if there exists an alternative cultural-institutional equilibrium that confers 
absolute advantage and to which a transition would be Pareto-improving. Trade impedes 
cultural-institutional convergence because it raises the costs of deliberate or accidental 
experimentation with uncommon preferences and contracts. Under plausible conditions it also 
increases the number of cultural or institutional innovators necessary to induce a decentralized 
transition from the low to the high productivity equilibrium. 
While the waiting time for a transition from the inferior to the superior cultural-institutional 
convention may be increased by trade, a transition to the superior culture and institutions can be 
induced by a one-time tariff even in the absence of idiosyncratic play. It is readily shown that 
there exists a tariff protecting the (imported) opaque good in country 2 such that a best response-
induced cultural-institutional transition will occur, country 2 adopting the {P,R} cultural-
institutional nexus. Assuming that the international price ratio is not affected by the tariff, let  *
ω θ  
and  *
φ θ  be the ad-valorem tariff rates on the opaque (imported) good which will implement an 
(after-tax) domestic price ratio in country 2 such that, respectively,  0 *
2 = ω  and  0 *
2 = φ . The 
transition-inducing tariff is given by  ] , min[
* * *
φ ω θ θ θ = . Using equations (7) it can be shown (see 
appendix A.2.3) that:  














































θ φ ω                (10) 
It is readily seen that  * *
φ ω θ θ <  as long as  R E μ μ w > + 2 . 
The logic of the transition-inducing tariff is exactly the opposite of the mechanism 
underlying the fact that trade liberalization is transition-impeding. The tariff makes the 
transparent good less valuable in terms of the units of the composite good it can command and 
hence reduces the joint surplus available to the employer and the employee. So the tariff reduces   20
the cost of deviation from the {F,E} convention, and a sufficiently large tariff will eliminate the 
deviation cost entirely. The level that eliminates the cost of deviation for either of the two classes 
is the transition inducing tariff  * θ . If 
* *
ω θ θ = , under the minimal transition inducing tariff it 
would be the employers who induce the transition because the real cost (in terms of t goods) of 
wages and monitoring has risen to such an extent that they do no better by offering Forcing 
contracts than by offering Partnerships. Any tariff greater than this makes the Partnership a strict 
best response for the employers. If, on the contrary, 
* *
φ θ θ = , the tariff would reduce profits 
under the Forcing contract to zero and would make employees indifferent to being reciprocal or 
self-regarding (if the employer is making zero profits the reciprocal employee is not offended by 
a Forcing contract).  
 
6. Factor market integration and transitions to efficient equilibria 
Many of the effects of international economic integration – like factor price equalization in Paul 
Samuelson’s theorem (Samuelson, 1948) – are independent of whether integration is 
accomplished through the elimination of barriers to trade in commodities or through the mobility 
of factors of production. Where comparative advantage is based on country differences in culture 
and institutions, as in our model, however, this is not the case.  
As we are interested in convergence to superior cultural-institutional conventions, we  model 
the effect of factor market integration on the stability of country 2’s inferior {F,E} convention. 
In contrast to trade integration, factor market integration facilitates a Pareto-improving cultural-
institutional transition in country 2. It does this by having the opposite of the two effects of trade 
integration: in the neighborhood of the {F,E} equilibrium, it lessens the costs of  idiosyncratic 
play and reduces the number of innovators required to induce a transition. Under factor market 
integration, cultural and institutional innovators may enjoy an advantageous match not only with 
rare innovators from their own economy but also with the prevalent type of agent from the other 
country. Thus factor market integration provides a kind of innovation insurance, in contrast to 
commodity market integration which imposes an innovation penalty, because of the gains from 
trade that heighten the opportunity costs of the frequent mismatches that innovators may expect 
when paired with agents from their own country.  
Suppose that some matches are made entirely with one’s own nationals while others are 
made randomly in the global population. As pictured in Figure 5, there are now three factor 
markets, two of them national-specific and the third, a common pool without country 
identification. The common pool is populated by agents drawn at random from the two country-  21
specific pools and hence has the same distribution of types as the meta-population (both 
countries combined). For both employers and employees in both countries let n be the fraction of 
matches made with individuals from one’s own nation, the complement, 1−n, being matches in 
the common pool.  
One may imagine the two countries as two “villages” within which all production takes 
place under autarchy. But with factor market integration some (a random draw from each of the 
two villages) go to the cosmopolitan “city” where they make random matches with members of 
the other class who they encounter there. In this model n is not chosen by the individual agents; 
it is a characteristic of the two countries’ cultures, language differences, geographical distance, 
immigration policies and other influences on factor movement that are exogenous from the 
standpoint of the individual employer or employee. 
In the autarchic factor markets we have thus far assumed n=1. But, if n<1, one’s expected 
match is n times the fraction of agents in one’s own country plus 1−n times the distribution of 
types in the common pool. To see that n is a measure of the degree of national specificity of 
factor markets and 1−n is the degree of factor market integration note the following. If the 
countries are in the neighborhood of the equalibria {P,R} (country 1) and {F,E} (country 2), the 
country difference in an employer’s probability of being paired with a Reciprocal employee is 
approximately n(1−2ε) (see appendix A.3.1), which must be positive and increasing in n by the 
persistence conditions given in section 4. This same quantity n(1−2ε) is the difference, 
conditional on being resident in country 1 or country 2, in the probability that an employee will 
be paired with an employer offering a Partnership contract. 
To avoid considerable notational clutter for no additional insight we assume that n does not 
vary across countries. When factors of production are matched in the pool we assume that the 
product produced is determined by the nationality of the employer, reflecting the fact that the 
physical assets of the employer are product-specific while the skills of the worker are less so 
(this assumption may easily be relaxed without altering the conclusions in any relevant way). In 
the case of autarchy, the prices at which the output is sold are also determined by the nationality 
of the employer. Thus, for example, when an employee from country 2 is matched with an 
employer from country 1, the pair will produce the opaque good to be sold either at the 
prevailing international prices (in the case of trade integration) or at the autarchic prices of 
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Fig. 5: Factor market integration. (NOTE: ε is the expected fraction of idiosyncratic players among 
both employers and employees, n is the degree of national specificity of the factor markets and 1−n 
is the degree of factor market integration) 
 
The expected payoff after factor integration is the weighted sum of the expected payoff in the 
national factor market plus the expected payoff in the common pool, the weights being the 
relative sizes of the two pools, n and 1−n (expected payoff equations are reported in the appendix 
A.3.2 for reasons of space). To determine the critical values, as before we equate expected 
payoffs, but we now take account of the effects of the degree of factor market integration. Thus 
we set  ) , ( ) , ( 2 2 n v n v F P ω ω =  and  ) , ( ) , ( 2 2 n v n v E R φ φ = , and obtain  ) (
*
2 n ω  and ) (
*
2 n φ . (We show in 
appendix A.3.2 that the following results obtain using both autarchic and trade prices which 
means that they apply equivalently to factor market integration for autarchic or trading 
economies.)  
First, for both employers and employees in country 2, factor market integration (reducing n) 
lessens the costs of idiosyncratic play, respectively for employers,  ) , 0 ( ) , 0 ( 2 2 n ω v n ω v P F = − = , 
and  for employees,  ) , 0 ( ) , 0 ( 2 2 n v n v R E = − = φ φ . The case of employers is straightforward. The 
F-type best responding employers in the {F,E} equilibrium will be disadvantaged (or unaffected) 
by factor market integration because they will have now a positive probability to match a 
reciprocal employee from country 1, who always provides quantitative labor alone under forcing 
contracts (as does Homo economicus), but is more costly to monitor ( E R μ μ ≥ ). By contrast, 
when  n<1,  F-type employers who idiosyncratically offer P-contracts will enjoy a payoff-
maximizing match (with a reciprocal worker) not only with the rare innovators from their own 
economy but also with the prevalent type of worker from the other country, who will constitute a 
sizeable fraction of the workers in the cosmopolitan pool. So the expected payoff to the best   23
responder decreases (or is unchanged) and the expected payoff to the idiosyncratic player 
increases leading to a lessened cost of deviation (see appendix A.3.3). 
The same logic applies to employees. Factor market integration increases the probability that 
both E-type players idiosyncratically adopting reciprocal preferences and best responding E-type 
workers conforming to the convention in the {F,E} equilibrium will make a payoff-maximizing 
match. However, the innovators’ payoff advantage from market integration is greater than the 
benefit received by the best responders. Both idiosyncratically playing and best responding 
employees in country 2 additionally benefit from the higher payoffs from being matched with a 
country 1 producer. In this case the worker will produce the opaque good (rather than the 
transparent good) to be sold either at the prevailing international prices (if trade integration is 








L ρ Q ρ Q > ) or at the autarchic prices of country 1 (in the absence 




L ρ Q ρ Q 2 1 > ). But taking account of both the better matching 
prospects and the increase in payoffs for both best responders and idiosyncratic employees, it can 
be shown (see appendix A.3.3) that innovators benefit from factor market integration more than 
best responders.  
Thus, factor market integration facilitates a transition from the inferior to the superior 
equilibrium because it reduces the payoff disadvantage of both idiosyncratically playing 
employers and employees compared to those conforming to the convention, and therefore it 
lessens the expected costs of innovating.  
Second, for the country at the inferior cultural-institutional equilibrium in country 2, it can 
be shown (see appendix A.3.4) that 
0
d












so that factor market integration  (reducing n)  lowers the critical fraction of innovators in both 
classes sufficient to induce a transition to the {P,R} cultural-institutional convention. Thus, 
factor market integration facilitates transitions to the superior cultural-institutional nexus.  
 
7. Discussion 
We have shown that otherwise identical economies that differ in culture and institutions may 
find specialization and trade welfare-enhancing, and that trade reinforces these differences by 
inhibiting convergence to superior cultural-institutional arrangements, while factor market 
integration favors convergence.    24
Our paper is a contribution to the rapidly growing literature on institutions and trade (earlier 
contributions surveyed in Belloc, 2006). Comparative advantage based on institutional 
differences has been investigated for the following settings: financial systems (Beck, 2002; 
Kletzer and Bardhan, 1987; Ju and Wei, 2005; Matsuyama, 2005; Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2005), 
enforcement of contracts and property rights (Esfahani and Mookherjee, 1995; Levchenko, 2007; 
Nunn, 2007), intellectual property rights (Pagano, 2007), contracts and the division of labor 
(Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman, 2009; Costinot, 2009), contractual incompleteness and the 
product cycle (Antràs, 2005), labor market flexibility and volatility (Cunat and Melitz, 2010), 
legal establishment and accounting systems (Vogel, 2007). In contrast to these papers, rather 
than studying the effects of exogenously given differences in institutions on comparative 
advantage and trade, we consider the impact of economic integration on the endogenous 
dynamics of institutions.  
Other papers treating the effects of trade on institutions are Belloc (2009), Casella and 
Feinstein (2002), Dixit (2003), Do and Levchenko (2009) and Levchenko (2010).  The main 
novelty of our approach with respect to this latter group of papers is our modeling of the 
complementary relationship between cultural preferences and institutions as a mechanism by 
which institutions associated with absolute disadvantage may persist indefinitely. In particular, 
our paper departs from and complements the work of Do and Levchenko (2009) and Levchenko 
(2010) in which institutional differences are a historical datum that may be modified by a 
cooperative lobbying game, while in our model they are implemented as an endogenously 
generated non-cooperative cultural-institutional equilibrium. Finally, unlike all above papers but 
in common with Olivier, Thoenig and Verdier (2008) and Pagano (2007), we find contrasting 
convergence effects of trade integration and factor market integration. But our model and these 
two models share little else in common, the former illustrates the dynamics of the demand for 
“cultural goods” that contribute to group identity, while the latter concerns intellectual property.  
The co-evolution of social norms and institutions is also modeled by Francois (2008). 
However, in contrast to our approach, in his model institutional change is implemented by an 
institutional designer external to the transaction (a political actor). Furthermore, while we 
explore the effects of economic integration on cultural-institutional equilibria, Francois (2008) 
studies the effect of increasing market competition. We share with Conconi, Legros and 
Newman (2009) the conclusion that liberalization need not favor the evolution of efficient 
institutions. In contrast to ours, in their model factor market integration may induce inefficiency, 
and only in conjunction with good market integration are the effects of the two positive (in our 
model factor market integration has unambiguously positive effects). As in Krugman (1987)’s   25
model of learning by doing, we show that a one time tariff may permanently alter a nation’s 
comparative advantage and induce welfare gains. 
The possibility that trade may induce institutional and cultural divergence rather than 
convergence is suggested by the experience of Europe in the late 19
th century, when the 
institutional  response to the import of cheap North American grain was radically different from 
country to country, resulting in a divergence with respect to tariffs and agrarian institutions 
(Gourevitch, 1977). Culture differences were also heightened, as the social solidarity of the 
subsidized Danish dairy cooperatives differed markedly from the nationalism associated with the 
German and French tariffs. Likewise, the centuries-long persistence of institutional differences 
among Western Hemisphere economies documented in Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) may be 
explained in part by the fact that trade allowed specialization in “plantation goods” such as sugar 
and cotton in some countries and “family farm” goods such as tobacco and wheat in others. 
Freeman (2000) and Moriguchi (2003) document a divergence in labor market institutions in 
open economies.  The “cultural and institutional bifurcation” of China and Europe studied by 
Greif and Tabellini (2010) could persist even in the presence of exchange (and would favor 
Europe’s specialization in goods in which economies of scale were more pronounced).  
These cases of divergence notwithstanding, the impact of the U.S. civil war studied by 
Nilsson (1994) is a reminder that cultural-institutional convergence does appear to be a powerful 
tendency in integrated global systems. But, like the convergence of European political 
institutions to the national state model over the half millennium prior to the First World War 
(Tilly, 1990), and the contemporaneous global diffusion of institutions and cultures of European 
origin, it also points to the important role of military and other political forces rather than the 
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A. Mathematical appendix 
A more detailed appendix (appendix B that is attached to the manuscript) will be available from 
the authors upon request and posted on the first author’s website.   30
A.1. Nash equilibria. Given our assumptions on the production process, to show that {P,R} and 

























o Q ρ Q ρ 2 1 >  can be rewritten as 
















L Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q + > + , which is true because it is equivalent to 




































t Q ρ Q ρ 2 1 >  is straightforward. 
A.2. Trade integration 
A.2.1 Trade integration increases the costs of deviation (We only consider country 2, 
extension to country 1 being straightforward).   
PART A: Employers. The cost of deviation in the {F,E} equilibrium is given by 
) 0 ( ) 0 ( 2 2 = − = ω ω P F v v , where  ) 0 ( 2 = ω F v  and  ) 0 ( 2 = ω P v  are given by equations (4) in the 




P F μ w Q ρ ω v ω v + − = = − = , which  is 
increasing in 
i
2 ρ .  
PART B: Employees. Similarly, the corresponding cost of deviation for employees is given by 
) 0 ( ) 0 ( 2 2 = − = φ φ R E v v , where  ) 0 ( 2 = φ E v  and  ) 0 ( 2 = φ R v  are given by equations (5) in the text 




R E μ w Q ρ α φ v φ v − − = = − = , which is also increasing in 
i
2 ρ . 
A.2.2 Trade integration increases the critical values 
* ω  and 
* φ . PART A: The derivative of 
*
j ω  given in (7) in the text with respect to 
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which is equation (8) in the paper and is always positive because  i
N
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L Q Q > and  E R μ μ ≥ . 
PART B: The derivative of 
*
j φ  also given in (7) with respect to 
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which is equation (9) in the paper and is positive iff  . 0 ) ( ) (
2 2















A.2.3 Transition-inducing tariff rate. The transition-inducing tariff is given by 
] , min[
* * *
φ ω θ θ θ = . The after-tariff price of the imported o-good in country 2 is  ) 1 ( *
ω
o
T θ p + .  
PART A: By equating 
*
2 ω  to zero, using the after-tariff trade prices, and then solving for  * 1 ω θ + , 
we obtain:  
, 1
) ( 2
) 1 (     i.e.   , 0 ) (









































which is the first of equations (10) in the text. 
PART B: Similarly, by equating 
*
2 φ  to zero and solving for 
* 1 φ θ + , we have: 








































which is the second of equations (10) in the text. 
A.3. Factor market integration 
A.3.1 Country probability difference of matching R-employees and P-employers.  In the 
neighborhood of the equalibria, the probability of an employer’s being paired with a Reciprocal 
employee conditional to being resident, respectively, in country 1 and in country 2 are 
n(1−ε)+(1−n)[s1(1−ε)+s2ε] and nε+(1−n)[s1(1−ε)+s2ε], where s1 and s2 are the sizes of country 1 
and country 2. It is straightforward to see that the difference between the two is 
n(1−ε)−nε=n(1−2ε). Similar expressions are readily found for the corresponding country 
difference in the probability of an employee being paired with a Partnership.  
A.3.2 Critical values  ) (n
* ω  and  ) (n
* φ  under factor market integration. The expected 
payoff in country 2 after factor integration is the weighted sum of the expected payoff in the 
national factor market plus the expected payoff in the common pool, the weights being the 
relative sizes of the two pools (n and 1−n). The expected payoff in the common pool, in turn, is 
the weighted sum of the expected payoffs from matching an individual resident in country 1 and 
in country 2 with weights (respectively) s1 and s2. Notice that in computing the expected payoffs 
in country 2 (equations (A1) and (A3) below) the ω and φ appearing in the terms referring to 
own country matching are the distributions of play not the distribution of types (the two differ 
due to idiosyncratic play). Because we assume that all employers (employees) in country 1 are 
Partnership types (Reciprocators), taking account of idiosyncratic play, country 2 agents who are 
matched in the pool with agents from country 1 will with probability 1−ε encounter employers 
(employees) offering P-contracts (reciprocal types), while with probability ε will match   32
employers (employees) offering F-contracts (self-regarding). The proofs contained in this 
subsection and in the following two are valid using both autarchic and trade prices. Clearly, if we 
consider trade prices it follows that 
t
T
t t ρ ρ ρ = = 2 1  and 
o
T
o o ρ ρ ρ = = 2 1 , whereas if we consider 
autarchic prices we have 
t t
2 1 ρ ρ >  and 
o o
2 1 ρ ρ < ; but our conclusions do not change in substance. 
To avoid ambiguity we use subscript 1 and 2 denoting the country (/equilibrium).  
PART A: Employers. The expected payoffs to employers offering P- and F-contracts are: 
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To obtain  ) ( 2 n
* ω , we compute the value of  ) ( 2 n ω  such that  ) , ( ) , ( 2 2 n ω v n ω v F P = ; after some 
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PART B: Employees: The expected payoffs to R- and E-employees are: 
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(A4) 
A.3.3 Factor market integration decreases the costs of deviation.  
PART A: Employers. The cost of deviation is given by  ) , 0 ( ) , 0 ( 2 2 n v n v P F = − = ω ω , where 
) , 0 ( 2 n vF = ω  and  ) , 0 ( 2 n vP = ω  are given by equations (A1) with  0 2 = ω . This difference is   33
smaller than the corresponding expression under factor immobility (n=1). This is easily shown 
by the fact that the expected payoff to an F-contract best responding employer under factor 
mobility is smaller than (or equal to) that under factor immobility because  E R μ μ ≥ , whereas the 
expected payoff to an idiosyncratic player offering a P-contract under factor mobility is greater 





t Q Q ρ ρ > . 
PART B: Employees. The cost of deviation is given by  ) , 0 ( ) , 0 ( 2 2 n v n v R E = − = φ φ , where 
) , 0 ( 2 n vE = φ  and  ) , 0 ( 2 n vR = φ  are given by equations (A3) with  0 2 = φ . This difference is 
smaller than the corresponding expression under factor immobility (n=1). Indeed, while both the 
expected payoff to E-type best responding employees and the expected payoff to idiosyncratic 
workers adopting R-preferences increase after factor market integration, the latter increases more 










t Q ρ Q ρ 1 2 > .  
A.3.4 Factor market integration decreases the critical values  ) (n
* ω  and  ) (n
* φ . PART A: 
Notice that the denominator of (A2) (which is positive) and the last term in squared brackets in 
the numerator does not depend on n. Then it is easily shown that  0 d / ) ( d
*
2 > n n ω . Indeed 






























The above inequality is true because it is equivalent to 
*
2 1 ω ε − < , which follows from the 
persistence conditions (see section 4 in the text). 
PART B:  Notice that the denominator of (A4) (which is positive) and the last term in the 
numerator does not depend on n. Then, it is easily shown that  0 d / ) ( d
*
2 > n n φ . Indeed 
0 d / )] /( ) 1 [( d 2 1 1 < + − n s ns s n  and  
. 0 ) ( ) 1 (
2






































The above inequality is true because it is equivalent to 
*
1 1 φ ε − < , which follows from the 
persistence conditions (see section 4 in the text). 
   34
B. DETAILED MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX (not intended for 
publication) 
This appendix will be available from the authors upon request and posted on the first author’s 
website.  
B.1 Nash equilibria. {P,R} and {F,E} are proven to be Nash equilibria as long as: (i) 





i Q ρ Q ρ , (ii)  ) ( 2 R
i
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i Q ρ μ w Q ρ > − − . Inequality (ii) is self-explained. The 
other inequalities are verified to be true given our assumptions on the production process that 
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t Q ρ Q ρ 2 1 >  is straightforward.  
B.2. Trade integration 
B.2.1 Critical values 
* ω  and 
* φ in autarchy.  
PART A: Employers. The expected payoffs to employers offering respectively P- and F-
contracts, where i=o,t and j=1,2, are: 
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*
j ω  is the level of  j ω  such that  ) ( ) ( j F j P v v ω ω = , i.e. 
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which is the first of equations (7) in the paper.  
PART B: Employees. Similarly, the expected payoffs to respectively R- and E-employees are:   35
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*
j φ  is the value of  j φ  such that  ) ( ) ( j E j R v v φ φ = , i.e. 
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=                            (B4) 
which is the second of equations (7) in the paper. 
B.2.2 Effects of trade integration on the costs of deviation. Trade integration, i.e. an increase 
in 
i
j ρ , increases the cost of deviating from the status quo cultural-institutional convention.  
Equilibrium 1: PART A: Employers. Rewrite the expected payoff equations for employers 
offering respectively P- and F-contracts when all the employees in the previous period were 
Reciprocators (i.e. equations (B1) with j=1 and  1 1 = ω ): 
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The cost of deviation in the {P,R} equilibrium is given by  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 = − = ω ω F P v v . Using 
equations (B5) this is equivalent to 
), (
2
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which is increasing in 
i




L Q Q − 2 / . 
PART B: Employees. Similarly, the expected payoff equations for respectively R- and E-
employees when all the employers in the previous period were offering P-contracts (i.e. 
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The cost of deviation in the {P,R} equilibrium is thus given by  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 = − = φ φ E R v v  which, 
using equations (B7), can be rewritten as 
,
2 2
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1 1
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which is also increasing in 
i





i Q ρ Q ρ 1 1 > . 
Equilibrium 2: PART A: Employers. Expected payoff equations for P- and F-contract 
employers when all the employees in the previous period were Homo economicus (i.e. equations 
(B1) with j=2 and  0 2 = ω ) are:
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The cost of deviation in the {F,E} equilibrium is given by  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( 2 2 = − = ω ω P F v v . Using 
equations (B9) this is equivalent to 
), (
2










ω ω + − = = − =                                   (B10) 
which is increasing in 
i
2 ρ . 
PART B: Employees. Similarly, expected payoff equations for respectively R- and E-employees 
when all the employers in the previous period were offering F-contracts (i.e. equations (B3) with 
j=2 and  0 2 = φ ) may be rewritten as: 
. ) 0 (
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R                                (B11) 
The cost of deviation in the {F,E} equilibrium is given by  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( 2 2 = − = φ φ R E v v  that, using 
equations (B11), turns out to be 




R E w Q v v μ ρ α φ φ − − = = − =                                (B12) 
which is also increasing in 
i
2 ρ . 
B.2.3 Effects of trade integration on the critical values 
* ω  and 
* φ .  Trade integration 
(increase in 
i
j ρ ) leads to an increase in the expected number of idiosyncratic players in either 
class (employers and employees) sufficient to induce a transition from the {F,E} to the {P,R} 
equilibrium. To show this we study the sign of the derivatives of  *
j ω  and  *
j φ  with respect to 
i
j ρ .  
PART A: Using expression (B2), the former is 









































































































































which is equation (8) in the paper and is always positive because  i
N
i
L Q Q > and  E R μ μ ≥ .  
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which is equation (9) in the paper and is positive iff  . 0 ) ( ) (
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B.2.4 Transition-inducing tariff rate.  0
* > θ  is the tariff protecting the opaque good in country 
2 such that a cultural-institutional transition from the {F,E} to the {P,R} convention will occur. 
Given the international price ratio,  *
ω θ  and  *
φ θ  are the ad-valorem tariff rates such that, 
respectively,  0 *
2 = ω  and  0 *
2 = φ . The transition-inducing tariff is given by  ] , min[
* * *
φ ω θ θ θ = . 
The after-tariff price of the imported o-good in country 2 is  ) 1 ( *
ω
o
T θ p + .  
PART A: By equating (B2) to zero, setting i=t, using the after-tariff trade prices, and then 
solving for  * 1 ω θ + , we obtain:  
, 1
) ( 2
) 1 (     i.e.   , 0 ) (









































which is the first of equations (10) in the paper. 
PART B: Similarly, using (B4) and solving for 
* 1 φ θ + , we have: 








































which is the second of equations (10) in the paper.   38
B.3. Factor market integration 
B.3.1 Critical values  ) (n
* ω  and  ) (n
* φ  under factor market integration.  
PART A: Employers. The expected payoffs to employers offering P- and F-contracts after factor 
market integration are (notice the superscript referring to the good and the subscript referring to 
the country do not change in the pool because, as explained in the paper, the nationality of the 
employer determines the good produced and the prices at which the output is sold): 
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To obtain  ) ( 2 n
* ω , we compute the value of  ) ( 2 n ω  such that  ) , ( ) , ( 2 2 n ω v n ω v F P = . It follows:  
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PART B: Employees: The expected payoffs to R- and E-employees after factor market 
integration are (notice that the superscript referring to the good and the subscript referring to the 
country change in the pool because, as explained in the paper, the nationality of the employer 
determines the good produced and the prices at which the output is sold):   39
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To obtain  ) ( *
2 n φ , we compute the value of  ) ( 2 n φ  such that  ) , ( ) , ( 2 2 n v n v E R φ φ = . We can write 
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B.3.2 Effects of factor market integration on the costs of deviation. The cost of deviation 
from the best response convention in the {F,E} cultural-institutional equilibrium for both 
employers and employees decreases after factor market integration (extension to the {P,R} 
convention is straightforward). 
PART A: Employers. First, we write the expected payoff equations for employers under factor 
market integration when all the employees in the previous period were self-regarding. These are 
given by equations (B13) with  0 2 = ω ,
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The cost of deviation is given by  ) , 0 ( ) , 0 ( 2 2 n v n v P F = − = ω ω . This difference is smaller than 
the corresponding expression under factor immobility (n=1) given in (B10) (notice that if trade is 
considered i=t by specialization, whereas if autarchy is considered the value of the output is 
invariant across sectors i=o,t). This is easily shown by the fact that the expected payoff to an F-
contract best responding employer under factor mobility (second of equations (B17)) is smaller 
than (or equal as) that under factor immobility (second of equations (B9) with i=t) because 
E R μ μ ≥ , whereas the expected payoff to an idiosyncratic player offering a P-contract under 
factor mobility (first of equations (B17)) is greater than under factor immobility (first of 





t Q Q ρ ρ > . 
PART B: Employees. The expected payoff equations for employees under factor mobility when 
all the employers in the previous period were offering F-contracts, i.e. equations (B15) with 
0 2 = φ , may be written as: 
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The cost of deviation is given by  ) , 0 ( ) , 0 ( 2 2 n v n v R E = − = φ φ , which is smaller than the 
corresponding expression under factor immobility (n=1) given in (B12). Indeed, while both the 
expected payoff to E-type best responding employees (second of equations (B18)) and the 
expected payoff to idiosyncratic workers adopting R-preferences (first of equations (B18)) 
increase after factor market integration, the latter increases more than the former because 










t Q ρ Q ρ 1 2 > .  
B.3.3 Effects of factor market integration on the critical values  ) (n
* ω  and  ) (n
* φ . Factor 
market integration leads to a decrease in the expected number of idiosyncratic players in either 
class (employers and employees) sufficient to induce a transition from the {F,E} to the {P,R} 
cultural-institutional convention. To show this, we study the sign of the derivative of  ) ( *
2 n ω  and 
) ( *
2 n φ , given respectively by (B14) and (B16), with respect to n.  
PART A: To study the sign of  n n d / ) ( d
*
2 ω , notice that the denominator of (B14) (which is 
positive) and the last term in squared brackets in the numerator does not depend on n. Then it is 
easily shown that  0 d / ) ( d
*
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which follows from the persistence conditions (see section 4 in the paper). 
PART B:  To study the sign of  n n d / ) ( d
*
2 φ , notice that the denominator of (A4) (which is 
positive) and the last term in the numerator does not depend on n. Then, it is easily shown that 
0 d / ) ( d
*
2 > n n φ . Indeed  0 d / )] /( ) 1 [( d 2 1 1 < + − n s ns s n  and  
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which follows from the persistence conditions (see section 4 in the paper).  